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Escaping the Under-Reform Trap
ANDERS ÅSLUND, PETER BOONE, and SIMON JOHNSON*
Most former Soviet republics have fallen into an economic and political under-
reform trap. An intrusive state imposes high tax rates and drives entrepreneurs
into the unofficial economy, which further aggravates the pressure on official busi-
nessmen. Tax revenues and public goods dwindle, further reducing incentives to
register business activity. This economic under-reform trap has a political coun-
terpart. Remarkably, Communist parties remain popular and opposed to estab-
lishing the rule of law precisely in those places where they were able to delay and
derail reform. No electoral backlash prompts the reforms necessary to leave the
under-reform trap. The best way out of the trap in countries such as Russia and
Ukraine is increased economic and political competition among the elite. [JEL
E65, H41, K42, P52]
P
arts of East-Central Europe and most of the former Soviet Union have fallen
into an economic and political under-reform trap. Managers hide their firms’
activities underground in order to escape regulation and reduce the bribes they
have to pay. High levels of underground activity keep tax revenues low, which
means the government cannot afford to provide public goods, such as law and
order, thus further lowering the incentives for entrepreneurs to enter the official
economy. These economies are caught in a trap: as few pay taxes, the tax burden
upon those who do becomes unbearable, inducing entrepreneurs to stay under-
ground even though this keeps their economic efficiency low and prevents growth.
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this article.At the same time, senior officials and powerful private individuals live well
through corrupt deals and sharing rents.
This economic under-reform trap has also an important political dimension.
Remarkably, there is little evidence of an electoral backlash against the people
who led countries into the under-reform trap. Countries that have not had much
reform tend to have little governmental change, quite strong Communist parties,
and little impetus for more reform. Conversely, however, countries that manage to
reform find that the political support for reform subsequently strengthens.
Until recently, these problems were perceived as temporary matters of transi-
tion, but it is now clear that many former Soviet bloc countries have become
trapped in a rent-seeking equilibrium. Slow and ineffectual reform created the
opportunity for corrupt bureaucrats and politicians to become entrenched and
extract bribes from firms. High inflation offered huge temporary rents, and the
longer it lasted the richer the rent seekers became. Slow privatization facilitated
extortion by government officials. By the end of 2000 it was possible for an
economy to be stabilized, widely privatized, and liberalized, yet remain trapped by
corruption and a large underground economy. Most former Soviet republics
appear trapped in this way.
Can a country break out once it is deeply in the trap? In this paper, the possi-
bilities for two countries—Ukraine and Russia—are compared, and a two-part
solution is offered. Economically, rents need to dwindle through competition and
new entry, while political power needs to be dissipated as a consequence of
competition among the elite. The policy goal should be to foster such competition.
It seems more difficult for Ukraine than for Russia to escape from the trap, but
even Ukraine has some reason to hope.
This paper updates findings first presented in Åslund, Boone, and Johnson
(1996). The economics of the under-reform trap were studied in Johnson,
Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997). Here we explain the politics of the trap, both in
terms of electoral outcomes and the pattern of competition among the elite.
I. The Economic Under-Reform Trap
Post-communist market economies fall into two main groups: those with
sustained recovery following a relatively radical transformation, and those stuck
without sustained growth because of gradual reform. In 1999, measured real GDP
in East-Central Europe was 5 percent lower than in 1989, but in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (the former Soviet Union without the
Baltics), real GDP was just 56 percent of its 1989 level (ECE, 2000, p. 225).
While performance has diverged dramatically, measured GDP exaggerates the
discrepancy, because the unofficial economy has expanded much more in the
former Soviet Union than in east-central Europe. Table 1 shows the results of esti-
mating the share of the unofficial economy in total GDP through 1995 using the
electricity consumption-based methodology presented in Johnson, Kaufmann, and
Shleifer (1997). Two divergent development paths are evident. The rather liberal
East-Central European countries started with a relatively large unofficial economy,
which peaked in 1992, and then declined moderately. In contrast, the unofficial
ESCAPING THE UNDER-REFORM TRAP































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.share in former Soviet countries was initially small and rose sharply until 1994
before flattening out. Strikingly, while the Polish unofficial economy share
declined from 1989 to 1995 by 3 percent of GDP, its share in Russia and Ukraine
surged by 30 percent and 37 percent of GDP, respectively. More recent work
(through 1997) shows the same pattern has continued—the unofficial economy is
typically 2–3 times larger, as a percent of GDP, in the former Soviet Union than in
east-central Europe (Eilat and Zinnes, 2000).
Adjusting for the unofficial economy, the contraction in real GDP has been
much lower than commonly supposed. In Russia, for example, output probably
fell no more than 20 percent during transition, but qualitatively, the large unoffi-
cial economy is an essential part of the under-reform trap. A large unofficial
economy means that few pay taxes, inciting governments to raise tax rates for
those few while providing minimal public goods, thus inducing entrepreneurs to
opt for the underground economy in a vicious circle.
Conversely, a marked difference has developed especially between Central
Europe and CIS countries in terms of general government spending as a percent
of both official and total GDP. In Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Hungary), general government spending declined insignificantly
from 51 percent of GDP in 1989 to 46 percent of GDP in 1999 (Tanzi, 1999). By
contrast, general government spending in the CIS fell on average from 46 percent
of official GDP in 1992 to 27 percent in 1999 (Tanzi, 1999).
The low level of tax collection is no reflection of liberalism in most CIS coun-
tries. While their level of actual tax collection varies greatly, the tax burden on
those who actually pay taxes is much higher than in Central Europe (Johnson,
McMillan, and Woodruff, 2000b). In fact, either high state revenues or high de
facto tax rates have characterized post-communist countries.
The functioning of the tax system is a reflection of a broader qualitative differ-
ence between these two subregions. A group at the World Bank originally calcu-
lated a composite structural reform index, which mainly reflects external
liberalization and price liberalization but also privatization (De Melo, Denizer, and
Gelb, 1997). For an ideal market economy, this index would be 1.00. As early as
1992, central Europe had an average structural reform index of 0.83, while it stood
at 0.29 in the CIS. Over time, the CIS countries have caught up, but when central
Europe recorded 0.90 in 1999, the CIS countries reached an average of only 0.63
(see Table 2). Because of slow initial reforms, the CIS countries have become
stuck at a lower level of liberalization and privatization.
While East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have converged
greatly in stabilization, liberalization, and privatization, this is not true of fairer
taxation, fewer regulations, and the rule of law. Countries with less distortionary
tax and regulatory systems have larger official economies, collect more tax
revenues, and provide more public goods.
The former Soviet Union is particularly bad at protecting entrepreneurs from
extortion by government officials (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer, 1997). The
survey reported in Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2000a) indicates that the
effective or perceived tax rates are almost twice as high in Russia and Ukraine
compared with three East-Central European countries (Poland, Slovakia, and
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91Romania). The evidence suggests that Central Europe, in particular, has made
substantial progress towards reforming its institutions, while most of the former
Soviet Union lags far behind, being caught in an under-reform trap, with high
effective taxation and intrusive regulation.
The most powerful entrepreneurs respond with various forms of “state
capture” (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000), effectively privatizing public
goods such as taxation and regulation to their own benefit, driving out competitors
Anders Åslund,Peter Boone,and Simon Johnson
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Table 2. Structural Reform Index, 1990–99
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central Europe
Poland 0.68 0.72 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.86
Czech Republic 0.16 0.79 0.86 0.90 0.88 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.90
Slovakia 0.16 0.79 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.90 0.90
Hungary 0.57 0.74 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.87 0.93 0.93
Southeast Europe
Romania 0.22 0.36 0.45 0.58 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.76 0.82
Bulgaria 0.19 0.62 0.86 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.67 0.79 0.79
Baltics
Estonia 0.20 0.32 0.64 0.81 0.83 0.77 0.78 0.82 0.90 0.93
Latvia 0.13 0.29 0.51 0.67 0.71 0.67 0.74 0.74 0.86 0.86
Lithuania 0.13 0.33 0.55 0.78 0.79 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.82 0.82
CIS
Russia 0.04 0.10 0.49 0.59 0.67 0.64 0.71 0.72 0.64 0.64
Belarus 0.04 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.42 0.50 0.44 0.37 0.37 0.37
Ukraine 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.13 0.33 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.65
Moldova 0.04 0.10 0.38 0.51 0.54 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.76 0.76
Armenia 0.04 0.13 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.54 0.61 0.61 0.76 0.76
Azerbaijan 0.04 0.04 0.25 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.61 0.61
Georgia 0.04 0.22 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.50 0.61 0.66 0.79 0.79
Kazakhstan 0.04 0.14 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.50 0.64 0.66 0.79 0.72
Kyrgyzstan 0.04 0.04 0.33 0.60 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.70 0.82 0.79
Tajikistan 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.55 0.58
Turkmenistan 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.36
Uzbekistan 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.30 0.50 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.57 0.50
Sources: De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1997); Havrylyshyn and Wolf (1999), p. 34; authors’calcu-
lations from EBRD (1998), p. 26, and EBRD (1999), p. 24.
Notes: This index was originally established by De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1997), with World
Bank assessments for 1990–94. They also indicated how their assessments were related to EBRD
indices. Havrylyshyn and Wolf (1999) updated their series for 1995–97, while we have updated corre-
spondingly for 1998 and 1999. The formula is straightforward. The first element is 0.3 times EBRD’s
indices for price liberalization and competition policy. The second element is 0.3 times EBRD’s index
for trade and foreign exchange liberalization. The third element is 0.4 times EBRD’s indices for large-
scale privatization, small-scale privatization and banking reform. Each index is normalized to reach a
maximum of 1. Thus, this index represents liberalization to 73 percent, while the rest is privatization.
The weights have been arbitrarily selected, but actually it does not matter much what weights are
chosen for the countries relative standing to one another, as the covariance is great.who are trying to obey the law. Small entrepreneurs exit the official economy, and
about half of the economy is now underground. Russia, Ukraine, and most of the
CIS have become true rent-seeking societies with a suboptimal equilibrium of low
economic efficiency (for modeling of such an equilibrium, see Johnson,
Kaufmann, and Shleifer, 1997).
II. The Electoral Under-Reform Trap
The economic under-reform trap has a political counterpart. In a democracy,
it would be reasonable to presume that informed citizens would vote for political
parties advocating policies that have brought about economic growth in other
countries. In general, among postcommunist countries, market reform and democ-
racy are strongly positively related, as Figure 1 shows. Full democracies have
usually undertaken advanced market reform, while semi-democratic states have
usually pursued limited reform, and real dictatorships have done little reform, as
is specified in Figure 2.
The countries of particular interest to us are those that have gotten stuck in an
under-reform trap—those in the middle of Figure 1: Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria,
Romania, and Russia. These countries have underperformed in terms of economic
reforms and economic growth (see Tables 1 and 2), and even so, the responsible
governments have repeatedly survived relatively free elections. How could this
have happened?
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Figure 1.  Democracy and Market Reform, 2000Assessing Election Results
In order to understand the politics of under-reform, we scrutinize election
results. We review only parliamentary election outcomes because presidential elec-
tions tend to be dominated by personal factors and offer a narrow choice, while
local elections are rarely relevant for national policy. Only election results in coun-
tries with a reasonable degree of political freedom can be considered. Nineteen
countries in the postcommunist region fulfill this criterion, being classified as
either free or partly free by Freedom House (Karatnycky, Motyl, and Graybow,
1999, p. 15). Seven countries do not qualify as even partly free, and they are there-
fore excluded (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia). To categorize the electoral outcomes, we need some
kind of party structure. Hence, Kyrgyzstan is omitted, because it had its first multi-
party elections in 2000, and even then parties played only a minor role.
Party structures vary much more in postcommunist countries than in Western
Europe. For our purpose, electoral outcomes are most easily classified by the
Communist party and its direct successors. Although the Communist parties have
been renamed in most countries, one evident successor party usually exists, and
splinter groups tend to alter their appearance.
Anders Åslund,Peter Boone,and Simon Johnson
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Figure 2. Democracy and Market Reform























Note: Countries were classified by Freedom House (2000) as “free” “partly free,” or “not free.” The border-
line between “advanced reform” and “limited reform” has been put at 0.80 on the EBRD structural reform index
for 2000, and as borderline between “limited reform” and “little market reform,” the index value 0.62 has been
chosen (EBRD, 2000).Even Communist parties evolve. They can be divided roughly into two groups:
those turning Social Democratic and those remaining Communist parties (some-
times becoming nationalist). Among the democratic countries, the old Communist
parties have become Social Democratic in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania,
Slovenia, and Macedonia, while they remain hard line in the Czech Republic and
throughout the former Soviet Union. This dichotomy remained largely true at the
end of 2000.
Parliamentary Election Results
All the democratic or semidemocratic countries in the region have undertaken
some market economic reforms. If such reforms were truly unpopular, we would
expect Communist parties to gain popularity and even win electoral majorities.
However, Table 3 shows that Communist parties have fared poorly regardless of
country and policy, with the exception of the marginal cases of Albania (where the
“democratic” forces abandoned democracy in 1997) and Mongolia in 2000 (which
is disregarded here as a very special case). By 1997, no other Communist party in
the region had attained one-third of the votes cast in the most recent democratic
election, and the Communist party was not the senior partner in any government.
The Communist parties in Italy, France, and Finland were actually larger during
the Cold War. Apparently, the popular nostalgia for communism has been very
limited.
Results from all the parliamentary elections are summarized in Table 3, and
these offer some intriguing conclusions. At the end of 1999, these countries could
ESCAPING THE UNDER-REFORM TRAP
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Figure 3. Communist Party Electoral Performance and Market
Economic Transformation, End-1999
Communist Parties  Communist Parties 
Doing Well Doing Badly













Note: The borderline between “radical transformation” and “incomplete transformation” has been put at
0.80 on the strtuctural reform index for 1998 (see Table 2), and as borderline between “communist parties
doing well” and “communist parties doing badly” 20 percent of the votes in the last elections up to summer



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.be divided into countries where the Communist parties received more than 20
percent of the votes cast in the latest parliamentary election (nine countries), and
countries where they obtained less than 20 percent (eight countries). The threshold
is a natural division with no country in the interval of 16–21 percent. The summary
classification is displayed in Figure 3, matching this political division by their
degree of market reform in 1998 (with the threshold set at 0.8), splitting the demo-
cratic transition countries into four quadrangles.
Three typical electoral paths can be distinguished. First, the top left box in
Figure 3 contains two countries that have undertaken radical marketization, and
even so, their Communist parties are doing well, namely Poland and Hungary.
Their communists were almost routed in 1991 and 1990, respectively. They have
staged strong comebacks to about 30 percent of the vote, however, as they were
thoroughly reformed early on, becoming right-wing Social Democratic parties.
These countries’ successful market economic transformation convinced even
communist leaders to reform, securing their political survival, and their conversion
led to the formation of a market economic consensus.
Second, in nine countries the Communist parties are now weak, receiving only
10–16 percent in the latest elections. These countries have all gone through
substantial market economic transformation and achieved substantial and lasting
growth. They should all be in the right upper box in Figure 3 (the latecomers,
Armenia and Georgia, have almost qualified). All these Communist parties have
undergone far-reaching reform, with the exception of the Latvian National
Harmony party, but not fast enough to jump onto the market economic band-
wagon. A broad consensus in favor of market reform was achieved without them.
This does not mean, however, that they are discredited for good. In Lithuania, the
former communists made a strong comeback in the elections of 2000 as social
democrats.
The bottom left box in Figure 3 represents the political under-reform trap. It
contains six countries where Communist parties have been relatively successful,
while the market economic transformation has been insufficient. These six coun-
tries are Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia. Two
different patterns are in evidence, depending on whether the Communist parties
stayed in power or not.
In Bulgaria and Romania the former Communist parties held on to power in
democratic elections until 1996–97. The cause of their demise was rampant
economic crises, for which the communist governments were clearly responsible.
In these two countries, the corrupt policies of partial reform were discredited, and
people voted against their bitter experiences of communist governments in the
post-communist period. In Bulgaria, a break with the system of rent seeking
occurred, while the communists returned to power in Romania in 2000, illustrating
the tenacity of the under-reform trap.
In Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the old Communist parties have remained
strong, usually gathering 20–30 percent of the votes cast. While not formally in
power in Ukraine or Russia,1 the communists have been highly influential in
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1Moldovan governments have been both unstable and hard to categorize precisely.parliament, as the electoral system made them over-represented, allowing them to
block reform legislation in coalition with other parties.
Whether in government or not, strong Communist parties have ensured that
the state has remained all-intrusive, with high taxation and extraordinary rent
seeking. The natural political outcome has been a state dominated by powerful
oligarchic business groups. The concentrated economic power around the state
also circumscribed democracy, while politics became polarized between oligarchs
and communists. Ironically, both groups favor similar economic policies and agree
on having a rent-seeking state. Accordingly, the EBRD (1999) finds that state
capture is the greatest in these semi-reformed countries (see also Hellman, Jones,
and Kaufmann, 2000).
The communists remain strong electorally because of dissatisfaction with the
new semi-reformed system, which produces little growth but great inequality,
while noncommunists vote for the strongest organized contenders against the
communist threat. With few independent entrepreneurs, the liberal right is too
weak to counterbalance both communists and oligarchs. Thus communists remain
reasonably strong and unreformed when market-oriented economic transforma-
tion is slow. This is the political under-reform trap.
III. Stickiness of the Reform Trap
The countries of greatest interest for our analysis are Russia and Ukraine.2
Both countries failed to attain significant economic growth until 2000 because of
late and partial reforms. To understand their problem, we first examine the initial
rents in these societies. Next, we check the ensuing effects on the dominant
economic-political groups. Finally, we consider the stability of the situation and
how it may change.
Early Rents in Russia and Ukraine
A mixture of state enterprise managers, new entrepreneurs, government offi-
cials, commodity traders, bankers, and outright criminals have grown rich on
government subsidies and regulations, that is, rent seeking. Today’s rent seeking
can be traced back to four dominant early forms of rent seeking in both Russia and
Ukraine.
The first form of rent seeking was to buy commodities on the domestic
market, which were cheap because of price regulation, and sell them abroad at the
world market price. This required access to the commodities and export permits.
About 40 percent of Ukraine’s exports in 1992 were commodities (mainly metals;
IMF, 1993b, p. 113), and their average domestic price was about 10 percent of the
world market price. Hence, the total export rents amounted to some $4.1 billion or
20 percent of GDP in 1992. The beneficiaries were managers of state metallurgical
companies, commodity traders, foreign trade officials, and some politicians. In
Anders Åslund,Peter Boone,and Simon Johnson
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2This section draws on Åslund (1999 and 2000).Russia, which had more commodities to export (mainly oil and metals), the export
rents in 1992 amounted to $24 billion or 30 percent of GDP (IMF, 1993a).
The second method was to import certain commodities, notably food in Russia
and energy in Ukraine, at a low subsidized exchange rate and resell them at a
higher domestic price. The main beneficiaries were a small number of gas
importers in Ukraine and food importers in Russia. In Russia, the import subsidies
amounted to 17.5 percent of GDP in 1992 (IMF, 1993a), and they were probably
as sizable in Ukraine, largely pertaining to energy imports from Russia.
The third form of rent seeking was access to subsidized credits. In 1993,
Ukraine experienced 10,155 percent inflation, but huge state credits were issued
at an interest of 20 percent a year—that is, state credits were sheer gifts, and they
were given to a privileged few. In 1992, net credit expansion to enterprises was no
less than 65 percent of GDP and 47 percent of GDP in 1993 (calculated from IMF,
1993b, p. 109; IMF, 1995, pp. 73, 105). In Russia, the net credit issue of the central
bank was 31.6 percent of GDP, and it was less in 1993 (IMF, 1993a). Thus, these
rents were greater and more lasting in Ukraine than in Russia.
The fourth form of rents was direct budget subsidies, which amounted to 8.1
percent of GDP in 1992 and 10.8 percent of GDP in 1993 in Ukraine (IMF, 1995,
p. 94). In Russia, they were 10.8 percent of GDP in 1992 and 9.4 percent of GDP
in 1993. In both countries, these subsidies were concentrated on agriculture and
energy—that is, gas in Ukraine and the coal industry in both countries. The subsi-
dized industries became totally criminalized by a struggle over these subsidies. In
total, rents as a share of GDP were huge in both countries but somewhat higher in
Ukraine than in Russia in both 1992 and 1993 because of greater credit emission
in Ukraine (Åslund, 1999, 2000). Much of these rents have been accumulated
abroad in tax havens.
In this way, a small select group of privileged insiders usurped a huge share of
GDP in the early years of transition and grew strong. They have no reason to
abandon their enormous power and wealth, which are based not on property, but
on diverted financial flows. For society, the result has been sharply rising income
differentials. Ukraine has reached a Gini coefficient of 47 and Russia 48, which is
about the same as the Latin American average (Milanovic, 1998, p. 41). By 1996,
macroeconomic stabilization was happily taking hold at long last in both coun-
tries, as the original rents dwindled, but the rent seekers stayed rich and powerful,
inventing new rents.
Both Russia and Ukraine have well-developed oligarchic power structures of
so-called financial-industrial groups, whose essence is to use political influence to
extract rents. A good relationship with the presidency has been essential to
success. In both cases, control over the media has been helpful to developing a
power base.
In Ukraine, the oligarchs sit in parliament themselves and lead large parties,
while Russian oligarchs tend to hire parliamentarians and purchase specific votes.
The Russian oligarchs started as small traders. Then they became bankers and
commodity traders, moving on to the production of raw materials for export in the
mid-1990s, and now they are going into manufacturing. The Ukrainian oligarchs
remain commodity traders, but a few have taken to metallurgy and the production
ESCAPING THE UNDER-REFORM TRAP
99of energy (Brady, 1999; Åslund, 2000). The government and the leading busi-
nessmen live in a curious symbiosis and mutual dependence. In order to be re-
elected, politicians need the support of the top businessmen (particularly those
who control the media), but the tycoons can be ousted by politicians if they turn
against the political leaders.
Especially in Ukraine, an iron triangle of government, businessmen, and
parliament ruled the country until 1998. All three groups favored a maximum of
regulation and state interference to maximize rent seeking and corruption, while
the effects on the population as a whole were of little consequence. The govern-
ment malfunctioned in the interests of the rent-seeking elite. This model of self-
reinforcing rent seeking looked like a frightfully stable suboptimal equilibrium,
reminiscent of the distribution of power in a stagnant African country (Collier and
Gunning, 1999).
Yet, the nature of the oligarchs’ interaction with one another and the govern-
ment changes swiftly. The main institutional change occurred with privatization.
Previously, the budding oligarchs merely colluded with state enterprise managers
and government officials. Now, they became owners of large enterprises, which
were by necessity visible. Their dependence on the state diminished. They started
defending private property rights, and they represented different industrial inter-
ests. Their greater security and more clearly defined interests intensified their
competition. As a result, their competition was transformed from obscure court
intrigue to public politics. In Russia, this occurred in 1994, after the initial voucher
privatization, while in Ukraine it happened only in 1998–99, after the large metal-
lurgical companies had been privatized in obscure inside privatizations.
In parallel, the legal situation changed. At the end of communism, large-scale
business was pervasively criminal and the murder rate rose steeply. Government
was unable to provide the legal institutions that make contracts enforceable. Crime
grew increasingly organized, and major businessmen established their own secu-
rity organizations. Greater order reduced the murder rate (Åslund, 1997). In
Russia, the internecine murdering among major businessmen ceased in 1994,
while it continued until 1996 in Ukraine. In recent years, the police have reestab-
lished their monopoly of violence, but their services are often bought by busi-
nessmen (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufman, 2000). The demand for court services is
rising steeply, prompting higher bribes for judges, while civil servants are deprived
of bribes, since they no longer have much to sell. After most property has been
distributed by state officials, the focus of bribery moves to judges responsible for
the security or redistribution of property.
Policies for Breaking the Trap
Looking back on the past decade, the fast qualitative changes are striking, and
the stability of the suboptimal equilibrium must not be exaggerated. For instance,
overindustrialization is soon to become a memory, as value detraction has faded.
From 1989 to 1998, the share of industry in GDP in Russia and Ukraine contracted
by 15 and 14 percent, respectively (World Bank, 2000). Future economic reform
in the former Soviet Union should be seen in this new light. The best option of
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contrary alternatives, either collusion or competition.
The advantages of collusion or deal making have been analyzed by some
economists and political scientists. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman (1998
and 2000) and Treisman (1998) have argued that it facilitated privatization and
macroeconomic stabilization in Russia. This was certainly true for privatization.
Ukraine, however, has abounded with deal making with no benefit for reform.
A competitive approach appears, instead, more likely to reduce rent seeking.
In their book, Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society, Robert B. Ekelund and
Robert D. Tollison argued that mercantilism ended in Britain because of a compe-
tition between the royal court and the parliament over monopoly rents and juris-
diction. In a similar vein, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1993) have
suggested that corruption should be fought through competition rather than prohi-
bition, which often implies a reinforcement of the monopoly of corruption, char-
acteristic of the Stalinist system. Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Shleifer and
Treisman (2000) have devised methods for how to organize competition among
rent seekers to drive bribes and rents down toward zero. When rents dwindle,
smart operators might find productive business more lucrative.
Competition is the opposite of a political and economic monopoly, and it
involves both politics and economics. A competitive approach to reform can be
described as seven related goals: (1) to split the political and business elite into
different groups; (2) to form independent political associations and enterprises
with secure legal bases; (3) to encourage competition among different groups;
(4) to achieve political and economic discontinuity; (5) to diminish the state’s
stranglehold on economy and society; (6) to achieve a maximum of transparency;
and (7) to break up or regulate monopolies. This competition should aim to
diminish rent seeking, thus enhancing economic efficiency.
There is a fundamental difference between taxation and regulation with regard
to desirable reforms. In taxation, competition must be avoided, as it leads to the
kind of overgrazing that has proliferated in the CIS and in many developing coun-
tries (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000; Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton,
1998). In regulation, however, competition can minimize bribery.
A first goal is to create more independent bodies. Throughout the post-Soviet
region, rent seeking has prospered around so-called natural monopolies in energy
and transportation (oil, gas, coal, pipelines, railways, and telecommunications),
but many of these are not natural monopolies. Telecommunications have been
divided and successfully turned competitive in Russia. Similarly, Russia has
broken up its oil industry into a dozen major oil companies. Although only one of
these privatizations was undertaken through competitive bidding, the Russian oil
industry has been transformed into a highly competitive industry. The natural gas
monopoly Gazprom, on the contrary, retains most ministerial regulatory functions,
forming the main bastion of asset stripping by managers through barter and transit
pricing, while it is badly mismanaged.
Coase’s Theorem (Coase, 1988), that the initial distribution of property does
not matter because property can be traded, has been much maligned. It presup-
poses the absence of transaction costs, which are very high in the transition
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less stringent hypothesis: it is more important that privatization be undertaken than
how it is undertaken. Historically, states have lived without private property for
centuries, while robber barons tend to be disciplined by the market within a few
decades. Over time, more property legislation is promulgated, and property rights
are reinforced through practice, as reflected by increased usage of courts by enter-
prises (Hendley and others, 1997).
According to the EBRD (1997), the private sector had grown to account for 70
percent of Russia’s GDP by 1997, while the Ukrainian private sector only deliv-
ered 50 percent of GDP in that year but slowly expanded to 60 percent by 1999
(EBRD, 2000). The combination of a growing private sector and the enhancement
of property rights amount to a threat to the old habits of rent seeking.
Certain state bodies also need autonomy, especially regional and local organs,
from the central state. Today, they have little independence and thus responsibility,
while the center is unable to supervise them, which inspires cheating by local
organs and arbitrary rule by the center. Most taxes are shared between two or three
administrative levels in a shifting and arbitrary fashion, which leads to additional
tax revenues of regional organs being confiscated by the central state (Kravchuk,
1999). Ideally, each tax would be fully allocated to one administrative level, for
instance, VAT, excise taxes, and foreign trade taxes to the central state, and prop-
erty taxes to local authorities. To make the division crystal clear, each tax base
should be allocated to one administration level, and each kind of expenditure
should be entirely financed by one level, for instance, defense by the central
government, but schools by local organs. Finally, the state tax service should be
divided between the three administrative levels as well to clarify responsibility and
accountability (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). Fiscal autonomy would encourage
competition between different administrative levels.
A large number of private enterprises are needed to support political competi-
tion. Autonomy for small entrepreneurs has empirically proven rather easy to
create. Essentially, only two things are needed—a simplified registration system
and a simple lump sum tax. The early introduction of wide-scale lump sum taxes
spearheaded the evolution of many small private enterprises in Poland, which later
formed the social, political, and economic base of radical market economic tran-
sition (Åslund, 1985). In 1998, Ukraine successfully launched a fixed lump-sum
tax for small entrepreneurs. It has stimulated the development of millions of small
enterprises, which will be the base of a true market economy.
If the state is characterized by rent seeking, state resources are used for private
enrichment and the repression of enterprise. Then, falling state revenues are desirable
to limit rents. With falling state revenues, resistance against a rational tax reform is
also likely to fade, as leading rent seekers will no longer perceive a cumbersome tax
system as an effective deterrent against business by outsiders. Or they might be too
weak to block a liberal tax reform. Thus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan
undertook radical tax reforms after state revenues had fallen sharply.
It is not enough, however, that state activities are cut for a lack of funds. Public
mandates must not be left unfunded but rather eliminated. A major cause of
corruption is that semiautonomous state organs try to raise their own revenues to
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central government (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Such public fund-raising is usually
undertaken through extortionary fees and penalties, being the most ineffective
taxes and amounting to a major cause of corruption.
The most plausible interpretation of growing barter and arrears up to 1998 was
that they formed a mechanism of extracting government subsidies and then priva-
tizing these subsidies through management theft. Total enterprise subsidies
amounted to no less than 16 percent of GDP in 1998 (Pinto, Drebentsov, and
Morozov, 1999). Otherwise, the cost of a barter deal should be deterring at about
25 percent of the deal (Djankov, 1999, p. 131). This extraction of implicit subsi-
dies through barter is facilitated through its nontransparency. With the financial
crash in Russia, barter fell like a stone from 54 percent of all interindustry trans-
actions to 21 percent in August 2000 (Russian Economic Barometer, 2000). A
parallel development has occurred in Ukraine. The government was forced to
harden its own budget constraints, demanding tax payments in cash, which elimi-
nated the possibilities to extract tax rebates through barter or offsets. The effect of
the dwindling barter has been not only greater monetization but also a leveling of
the playing field, intensified competition, and economic growth.
One of the most erroneous ideas in much of the transition literature is that
political and economic continuity are vital, because a valuable administrative
capital exists that must be utilized (Stiglitz, 1999). On the contrary, a maximum of
discontinuity is desirable in both the political and economic spheres.
The EBRD (1999) Transition Report 1999 shows that the greater the discon-
tinuity in the ruling elite, the more radical and successful the market economic
reform. Progress in liberalization “was twice as high in countries where the polit-
ical executive was replaced as in those where the incumbent from the communist
era remained in office” (p. 106). Transition countries with more competitive polit-
ical systems and more unstable governments have tended to achieve greater
progress in economic reform. The five transition countries with the most frequent
changes in government have been the three Baltic States, Poland, and Bulgaria, of
which four have been among the most successful reformers (p. 112). The apparent
explanation is that turnover of personnel leads to greater transparency and more
checks on corruption. The greater turnover of governments can also be seen as a
reflection of more effective democracy, one of the best checks on a rent-seeking
elite (see Figure 1).
The same is true of certain economic discontinuity. Drazen and Grilli (1993)
have modeled how economic crises may facilitate reform by undermining harmful
vested interests both financially and politically. The Russian financial crash under-
mined the ruling oligarchy, thus facilitating substantial reforms, notably budget
and tax reforms, which contributed to unexpected economic growth in 1999 and
2000. Thanks to its hyperinflation of 1996–97, Bulgaria changed political leader-
ship through democratic elections and undertook far-reaching liberal economic
reforms, seemingly breaking out of its under-reform trap. The Romanian crisis of
1996–97, on the contrary, does not appear to have been sufficiently severe.
Insufficient reforms proved ineffective and allowed the comeback of rather unre-
formed communists through democratic elections in 2000.
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countries are now liberal and open economies with large exports in relation to their
GDP (see Table 2). Some monopolies are truly natural, but they can be structured
to reduce rent seeking. For example, the power companies in Russia are aligned
with individual regions, and regional governors have substantial control over tariff
setting and personnel appointments. Therefore, these companies have become the
fiefdoms of regional leaders, who typically keep tariffs low, prohibit electricity
companies to cut off local enterprises, and force them to supply regional govern-
ments for free. If several regional companies are merged, they fall outside of the
control of each governor.
A popular idea in attempts to reduce corruption through administrative harass-
ment has been the attempted establishment of one-stop shops for licensing and
foreign investors in various countries, but such efforts run counter to the compet-
itive approach and they have failed in many countries, as this implies a monopoly
of corruption. Instead, several agencies could be allowed to issue the same licenses
and permits, prompting them to provide better and cheaper services in competition
with one another. For example, a visit to Bishkek in 1998 revealed that the city
architect had swiftly registered all land for housing and issued titles for the land,
because two competing agencies were doing the same, and it was enough to get
title from one of them. Similarly, enterprises could be allowed to register with
different agencies, as long as multiple registrations are not required. Organs at
federal, regional, and local level could all be allowed to issue all licenses that
exist.
The basis of civil society is public learning, which is probably a reason for the
brevity of each method of rent seeking. As people have understood, reforms have
become necessary. Either followers have jumped into the game to make money for
themselves, for instance, driving rents down through arbitrage, or others have
reacted against the rent seeking and demanded structural changes. For instance,
cheap credits could be publicly defended in 1992 in Russia and Ukraine, but
everybody knew they caused hyperinflation by 1994. The quality, and thus
freedom, of the media is crucial for this public learning. Besides, much of the old
rent seeking has been built on structural inertia and fear of change, but as the
necessary structural changes proceed through downsizing by default, many obsta-
cles to reform fade away.
Our line of argument fits the model of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
(2000) of political losers as barriers to economic development. They argue that
socially beneficial economic reforms are being blocked, “when the political power
of the incumbent is threatened by economic innovation” (p. 128). Their model
indicates that the incumbent monopolist is more likely to block the introduction of
new technologies when political rents from staying in power are greater, when
monopoly profits from blocking are greater, and when the tax revenue they can
collect from rivals are smaller. While this paper discusses an oligarchy rather than
a monopoly, it shows how this confluence of political and economic oligarchy
works in practice.
A corollary of this reasoning is that an oligarchy is much better than monopoly
and dictatorship. Belarus and Turkmenistan present a far more stable under-reform
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minimal liberalization of the economy and full dictatorship (EBRD, 2000).
IV. Conclusions
Russia and most former Soviet republics have actually become rather normal
market economies, because most market economies have weak rule of law, a few
dominant business groups, and a close relationship between government and busi-
ness. Russian and Ukrainian levels of corruption and political conflict are not
unique. They have fallen into a fairly common trap: high corruption drives the
economy underground and offers few incentives to enter the official economy. We
have discussed this as an under-reform trap, but this is really a special case of a
more general development trap.3
There are three possibilities for market economies trapped with weak institu-
tions. First, there may never be growth, as has been the experience in much of
Africa for decades. Second, if it is in the interest of some part of the elite, some
growth may occur, and this creates the incentive for managers and governments to
behave better and steal less. Growth becomes self-fulfilling and self-supporting, as
in poorer parts of Europe over the past 40 years. Eventually, institutional reform
occurs, but it usually requires the involvement of a third party (like the European
Union). Third, rapid growth may alternate with episodes of economic collapse.
This has been the experience of Latin America over the past 40 years, and it may
now be the case of East Asia.
Institutions cannot be built without political demands for institutions, and such
demands depend as much on the nature of the economic system as on the political
system. For a dictatorship or business hegemony, any institution is harmful, as it
implies a reduction of absolute power. An oligarchy may find an equilibrium, but
it is potentially unstable, as is an oligopoly. The question whether there is a suffi-
ciently strong demand for sound market economic institutions in Russia and
Ukraine is a question whether the economic and political pluralism is strong
enough to allow these countries to break out of their under-reform trap. The finan-
cial crash in Russia broke many oligarchs both financially and politically, while
broadening the number of big businessmen. It also increased the demand for stable
financial institutions in all groups of society. Meanwhile, increasing competition
is bound to reduce rents, and eventually rent seekers may opt for profits instead.
The driving force of positive change has to be entrepreneurs who feel they are at
a disadvantage because of the privileges of others.
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3For evidence on the importance of institutions in economic development more generally, and the
long-lasting effects of early institutions (such as how a country was colonized), see Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2000). For the size and determinants of the underground economy around the world, see
Friedman and others (2000).REFERENCES
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